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Abstract
The paper introduces the concept of Homo immunologicus from You Must Change 
Your Life by the German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk, and discusses it together with Niklas 
Luhmann’s theory of Social Systems. It tries to explain the changes within the concepts of 
immunity that come about through the processes of adaptation from the natural sciences to the 
discourses of the humanities and social sciences. The paper also calls attention to historical 
variations in the conceptualizations of immunity within various scientific immunological 
discourses and to the criticism and analysis of scientific discourses on immunology from the 
point of view of cultural studies. Since the author is not a specialist in Japanese Studies, the 
paper ends with a very short, tentative outlook on how Sloterdijk’s and Luhmann’s theories 
might be applied to post-Fukushima Japan, leaving, however, further discussion to the experts 
in that field.
I. 
The German society – if such a generalization may be permitted – reacted to the Fukushima 
Nuclear Accident in Japan in March 2011 with an extraordinarily radical demand: to immediately 
back out of the German national nuclear energy program. Germans also expected the Japanese 
to do so, and the majority of them are bewildered by the fact that the Japanese, in spite of the 
devastating accident and its foreseeable long-term consequences, in spite of the underlying hazardous 
seismographic characteristics of their home soil, are not following suit. The radicalness with which 
the Germans reacted is due to long-term discourses prevailing in the German public, ranging from 
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ascribed to the transcendent powers […] Since the global catastrophe began its partial 
unveiling, a new manifestation of the absolute imperative has come into the world, one 
that directs itself at everyone and nobody in the form of a sharp admonition: “Change 
your life! Otherwise its complete disclosure will demonstrate to you, sooner or later, 
what you failed to do during the time of portents!” (Sloterdijk 2013: 444)
According to Sloterdijk all mankind is confronted with this looming danger, the global catastrophe, 
throwing its shadows in forms of earthquakes, tsunamis, and nuclear accidents, tornados, 
hurricanes, and oil pollution, droughts, inundations, and global warming, famine, pandemics, and 
overpopulation, economic bubbles, crashes, and impending wars. And therefore all mankind feels the 
need to brace themselves – the religious as much as the atheists. “The false dichotomy of believers 
and unbelievers becomes obsolete and is replaced by the distinction between the practicing and the 
untrained, or those who train differently” (Sloterdijk 2013: 3). What remains, are not religions and 
parties, nations and cultures, but only regimens more or less capable and worthy of propagation. The 
human being appears in its original shape as that species which uses practice in order to survive:
After centuries of experiments with new forms of life, the realization has dawned that 
humans, whatever ethnic, economic and political situation might govern their lives, 
exist not only in “material conditions”, but also in symbolic immune systems and ritual 
shells. (Sloterdijk 2013: 3)
Peter Sloterdijk offers nothing less than a new concept of the human species, and introduces 
the “Homo immunologicus, who must give his life, with all its dangers and surfeits, a symbolic 
framework”. It is an ethical human being, struggling with itself in concern for its form, a Homo 
repetitivus, the Homo artista in its extreme version (Sloterdijk 2013: 10). The stress on form is 
important here, because the Homo immunologicus is not simply answering to the demands forced 
upon him by an all too often adversary environment, he is as much designing himself along these 
lines, displaying an immense amount of self-awareness. Repetition therefore serves not only 
performance enhancement, reaching as far as the astounding achievements of artists and athletes, but 
it also serves discursive strategies of the performative. The pivot of Sloterdijk’s extensive analysis 
of the conditio humana in an anthropological and global framework is the conceptualization of the 
immune system, the propagation of which dawned in late-nineteenth century biology:
From that point on, none of the scientific integrities – animal organisms, species, 
“societies” or cultures – could remain the same. Only hesitantly did people begin to 
understand that the immune dispositifs are what enable systems to become systems, 
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the Student Revolution of the 60s and the Anti-War, Anti-Nuclear Warfare, Anti-Nuclear Energy 
demonstrations of the 70s and 80s to much older, centuries encompassing discourses imbedded 
in philosophical and social theories, in religious and political concepts, and in formulas and 
conceptualizations in medicine and the natural sciences.
II. 
The title of the book that the well-known German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk published 
in 2009, two years before the fatal accident, seems to encapsulate this German zeitgeist: “You 
Must Change Your Life”. This book answers to the two great challenges that the world is 
confronted with according to Sloterdijk. The foremost subject of the book is therefore the so-
called “religious clashes”, drastically epitomized in the American-Islamic confrontation since and 
before September 2001. In spite of his fierce and astute criticism, Sloterdijk is trying to envisage a 
tertium comparationis for the dead-locked antagonists and to build a bridge to overcome these so-
called “religious” differences. In his view all religions and societies in this world are based on one 
and the same principle, i.e. “spiritual regimen”2 (Sloterdijk 2013 : 3), which is practiced world-
wide in collectives such as “church”, “ordo”, “umma”, “sangha” or practiced individually in a more 
modernized version through interaction with a “personal God”. What unites the followers of the most 
diverse religions is therefore the concept of practice – practicing Buddhism, Islam, Christianity – 
being a member of a certain religion by doing something, living in a certain way, according to certain 
rules. Moreover, all religions expect their followers to improve themselves and their relationship 
to whatever they deem holy. Historically the “moral”, “ethic”, “ascetic”, “pious”, or “spiritual” 
imperative “You must change your life” has therefore been predominantly linked to religious 
concepts or their secular modern off-springs. But who is to pronounce this imperative in a world full 
of religious and political factionalism and rivalry? Here Sloterdijk’s second looming challenge enters 
the stage:
The only authority that is still in a position to say “You must change your life!” is the 
global crisis, which, as everyone has been noticing for some time, has begun to send 
out its apostles. Its authority is real because it is based on something unimaginable of 
which it is the harbinger: the global catastrophe. One need not be religiously musical 
to understand why the Great Catastrophe had to become the goddess of the century. As 
it possesses the aura of the monstrous, it bears the primary traits that were previously 
2 Quotations are taken from the English translation of Peter Sloterdijk’s Du mußt dein Leben ändern: Über 
Anthropotechnik (2009).
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yet his rhetorical playfulness reflects his awareness of the dilemma of finding old words for new 
concepts, which is at the bottom of the philosophical side of the immunological endeavor. And in 
fact, this semantic and consequently conceptual problem of describing immune systems is at the very 
heart of any metaphorical adaptation of “immunology” to the discourses of the humanities and social 
sciences (Napier 2003).
Viewed in this light, life itself appears as a dynamics of integration that is equipped 
with auto-therapeutic or “endo-clinical” competencies and refers to a species-specific 
space of surprise. It has an equally innate and – in higher organisms – adaptively 
acquired responsibility for the injuries and invasions it regularly encounters in its 
permanently allocated environment or conquered surroundings. Such immune systems 
could equally be described as organismic early forms of a feeling for transcendence: 
thanks to the efficiency of these devices, which are constantly at the ready, the 
organism actively confronts the potential bringers of its death, opposing them with 
its endogenous capacity to overcome the lethal. Such functions have earned immune 
systems of this type comparisons to a “body police” or border patrol. But as the 
concern, already at this level, is to work out a modus vivendi with foreign and invisible 
powers – and, in so far as these can bring death, “higher” and “supernatural” ones – 
this is a preliminary stage to the behaviour one is accustomed to terming religious or 
spiritual in human contexts. (Sloterdijk 2013: 8)
Sloterdijk now pushes his argument two steps further: With an as much maieutic as ironical, 
metaphorical twist he exchanges the two sides of the comparison: the compared with the comparing, 
while at the same time reversing the temporal relationship. While one would expect that the immune 
system becomes the metaphorical description of the fears and practices of human beings, ergo the 
fundamental transcendental dimension of human beings receiving “immunitary” attributes, Sloterdijk 
in fact ascribes quasi-transcendental attributes to the primordial immunitary constitution of living 
beings on a mere biological level as “early forms of a feeling of transcendence”. And this allows 
him to go one step further, i.e. to reunite the two parts, or better: to blur the line of the two parts of a 
traditionally sacred division of body and soul, or matter and mind, which now appear as a continuum 
in his “immunological” conceptualization. This is also reflected in his choice of words, endowing 
“life itself” with “auto-therapeutic” competencies, heretofore reserved rather for psychological and 
cognitive activities. Nevertheless, Sloterdijk is far from any argumentation rooted in the supremacy 
of biologism. The coinage “space of surprise” (“Überraschungraum”) forces the biological argument 
back into the cognitive realm. It also does away with the one-dimensional concept of aggression, as 
expressed in words like “invasive” or “adversary”, or behavioristic terms such as “irritating”, and 
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life forms to become life forms, and cultures to become cultures in the first place. It 
is only by virtue of their immunitary qualities that they ascend to the level of self-
organizing unities, preserving and reproducing themselves with constant reference to a 
potentially and actually invasive and irritating environment. (Sloterdijk 2013: 7-8)
In this first encounter with the concept of immune systems offered to his readers, Sloterdijk 
draws on various aspects. He hints at the revolutionary dimension of the immunological discoveries, 
said to redefine the basic forms of life on earth. He makes reference to the adherent concept of 
environment, visualized as invasive and irritating, i.e. adversary, but also stimulating. He insists 
on the power of immune systems to bring specific life forms into being and keep them alive, 
but at the same time plays on the double meaning of culture (in anthropological and agricultural 
discourses), taking back some of the seemingly clear-cut definitions presented here. Indeed the basic 
concepts of “immunitary qualities” and “immune dispositifs” remain obscure. The adaptation of 
“immunity” to the discourses of the humanities and social sciences is an extremely protean process 
undertaken by various thinkers in manifold ways. In order to understand Sloterdijk’s discursive 
position and philosophical aim, we must follow his chain of argumentation very carefully, and set 
great store by his peculiar way of wording his ideas and interpretations, which in their imagery and 
conceptualizations are more often than not surprising, flamboyant or even flabbergasting.
It is the discoveries and theories of Ilya Metchnikoff, Louis Pasteur, Robert Koch, Paul Ehrlich, 
Carl von Nägeli, Karl Landsteiner and Shibasaburo Kitasato, just to mention the outstanding players 
of the formative phases of what was later to be named immunology, which attract Sloterdijk’s 
curiosity:
There one finds the baffling idea that even relatively simple organisms like insects and 
molluscs have a native “foreknowledge” of the hazards that accompany a typical insect 
or mollusc life. Consequently, immune systems at this level can be defined a priori as 
embodied expectations of injury and the corresponding programmes of protection and 
repair. (Sloterdijk 2013: 8)
Even though Sloterdijk puts the “foreknowledge” in quotation marks hinting at the inadequacy 
of a cognitive term ascribed to simple organisms, he continues with a somewhat ironical, yet still 
straightforward description of immunitary qualities in mollusc and insect life: the phrase “embodied 
expectations of injury” hovers on the edge of corporeal and psychological, somatic aspects of 
living beings, whereas the following phrase “programmes of protection and repair” refers to the 
technological and military spheres of life. Here, too, the explanation of what is really going on in 
immune systems remains rather vague. Sloterdijk borrows vocabulary from other realms of life, 
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It is by no means Sloterdijk’s intention to create an automatic machinery to produce and reproduce 
legal, solidaristic and military or religious and ideological systems based on the concept of immunity. 
The redefinitions and revisions of law, community, military, ideology and religion and so forth as 
“immune systems” serve only to better analyze and understand what is at stake in cultural entities. 
The traditionally construed noble concept of right and wrong for example crumbles when confronted 
with the down-to-earth “immunitary” idea of keeping a society going by keeping the perpetrators in 
check. In Sloterdijk’s view a non-naïve approach to symbolic immune systems, i.e. understanding 
religions or cultures etc. as symbolic immune systems, is vital for the survival of mankind within the 
diversity of its cultures and religions in a shrinking global setting.
Unfortunately Sloterdijk’s You Must Change Your Life does not offer more than a preliminary 
introduction to a critique of social and symbolic immune systems. The core of the book deals with 
the concept of anthropotechnics, i.e. the various practices of the Homo immunologicus as unfolded in 
the course of history. However, en passant Sloterdijk mentions Niklas Luhmann’s conceptualization 
of the legal system “as society’s immune system” in his comprehensive treatise on Social Systems. 
We will turn to this now in order to find out along what lines Luhmann is incorporating the concept 
of “immune systems” into his general theory of social systems. The sheer proportion that the 
discussion of the conceptualization of a social immune system takes in Luhmann’s analysis explains 
why it is missing in You Must Change Your Life: Sloterdijk bases his argumentation on Luhmann’s 
much earlier writings, yet at the same time he distances himself from Luhmann’s position.
III. 
Let us take up Niklas Luhmann’s example of the legal system as society’s immune system. 
Although the example of the legal system does not reflect all dimensions and the intricacy of the 
concept of social immune systems, it gives a very clear and concrete first idea of what Luhmann’s 
theory is about; Luhmann himself introduces it in order to “clarify the highly abstract and 
unaccustomed concept of mechanisms of social immunization”3 (Luhmann 1995: 373). The idea 
that the legal system functions as society’s immune system does of course not cover all functions of 
the legal system within a society. It is the aspect of its function to generalize expectations in view of 
risky behavior that connects the legal system to the immune system of society: “The security attained 
by law (which concerns, not situations that can actually be achieved, but one’s own expectations) 
rests on the fact that one communicates one’s own expectations even in contradiction, although in a 
way opposed to normal communication and having different connective values”. (Luhmann 1995: 
3 Quotations are taken from the English translation of Niklas Luhmann’s Soziale Systeme: Grundriß einer 
allgemeinen Theorie (1984).  
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leads consequently to the conceptualization of a far more complex relationship of organism and 
environment, or of self and other, as we shall see later. It is no longer the concepts of “invasion” or 
“irritation” but “dynamics of integration” which are supposed to govern the relationship of organism 
and environment.
With the argument in the above quotation a continuum is established between basic biological 
(or chemical) reactions and the complex cultural spheres usually thought of as reserved for the 
human being only. For the sophisticated sphere of human beings Sloterdijk postulates no fewer than 
three immune systems, layered on top of one another and collaborating closely.
In the course of man’s mental and socio-cultural evolution, two complementary 
systems have developed for the pre-emptive processing of injuries: firstly the 
socio-immunological methods, especially legal and solidaristic ones, but also the 
military ones by which people resolve their confrontations with distant and foreign 
aggressors and insulting or harmful neighbours; and secondly the symbolic or psycho-
immunological practices on which humans have always relied to cope – with varying 
success – whit their vulnerability through fate, including mortality, in the form of 
imaginary anticipations and mental armour. (Sloterdijk 2013: 9)
The three immune systems of the human sphere are 1) the primary bio-chemical one, 2) the socio-
immunological one encompassing legal, solidaristic, military methods, and 3) the symbolic and 
psycho-immunological one including ideological and metaphysical, religious methods. This time 
Sloterdijk takes again recourse to the images of aggression and attack, clearly expressed by “foreign 
aggressors” and “insulting and harmful neighbors” for reasons of clarity and in order to drive this 
basic argument home. Yet again, one should not fail to notice the obviously ironically exaggerated 
naivety of these images. The following passage then consequently takes a critical stance and shows 
the limitations of the postulated secondary immune systems:
It is one of the ironies of these systems that their dark sides are capable of explication, 
even though their existence depends on consciousness from the start and they consider 
themselves self-transparent. They do not function behind the backs of subjects, 
being entirely embedded in their intentional behaviour – nonetheless, it is possible to 
understand this behaviour better than it is understood by its naïve agents. This is what 
makes cultural science possible; and it is because a non-naïve approach to symbolic 
immune systems has itself become vital to the survival of “cultures” today that cultural 
science is necessary. (Sloterdijk 2013: 9)
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unaccustomed concept of mechanisms of social immunization”3 (Luhmann 1995: 373). The idea 
that the legal system functions as society’s immune system does of course not cover all functions of 
the legal system within a society. It is the aspect of its function to generalize expectations in view of 
risky behavior that connects the legal system to the immune system of society: “The security attained 
by law (which concerns, not situations that can actually be achieved, but one’s own expectations) 
rests on the fact that one communicates one’s own expectations even in contradiction, although in a 
way opposed to normal communication and having different connective values”. (Luhmann 1995: 
3 Quotations are taken from the English translation of Niklas Luhmann’s Soziale Systeme: Grundriß einer 
allgemeinen Theorie (1984).  
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leads consequently to the conceptualization of a far more complex relationship of organism and 
environment, or of self and other, as we shall see later. It is no longer the concepts of “invasion” or 
“irritation” but “dynamics of integration” which are supposed to govern the relationship of organism 
and environment.
With the argument in the above quotation a continuum is established between basic biological 
(or chemical) reactions and the complex cultural spheres usually thought of as reserved for the 
human being only. For the sophisticated sphere of human beings Sloterdijk postulates no fewer than 
three immune systems, layered on top of one another and collaborating closely.
In the course of man’s mental and socio-cultural evolution, two complementary 
systems have developed for the pre-emptive processing of injuries: firstly the 
socio-immunological methods, especially legal and solidaristic ones, but also the 
military ones by which people resolve their confrontations with distant and foreign 
aggressors and insulting or harmful neighbours; and secondly the symbolic or psycho-
immunological practices on which humans have always relied to cope – with varying 
success – whit their vulnerability through fate, including mortality, in the form of 
imaginary anticipations and mental armour. (Sloterdijk 2013: 9)
The three immune systems of the human sphere are 1) the primary bio-chemical one, 2) the socio-
immunological one encompassing legal, solidaristic, military methods, and 3) the symbolic and 
psycho-immunological one including ideological and metaphysical, religious methods. This time 
Sloterdijk takes again recourse to the images of aggression and attack, clearly expressed by “foreign 
aggressors” and “insulting and harmful neighbors” for reasons of clarity and in order to drive this 
basic argument home. Yet again, one should not fail to notice the obviously ironically exaggerated 
naivety of these images. The following passage then consequently takes a critical stance and shows 
the limitations of the postulated secondary immune systems:
It is one of the ironies of these systems that their dark sides are capable of explication, 
even though their existence depends on consciousness from the start and they consider 
themselves self-transparent. They do not function behind the backs of subjects, 
being entirely embedded in their intentional behaviour – nonetheless, it is possible to 
understand this behaviour better than it is understood by its naïve agents. This is what 
makes cultural science possible; and it is because a non-naïve approach to symbolic 
immune systems has itself become vital to the survival of “cultures” today that cultural 
science is necessary. (Sloterdijk 2013: 9)
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permit everything. Nor is it a matter (as natural law thought) of enforcing a naturally 
given order against the free and corrupt human will. […] Law must fulfill the function 
of an immune system, and it is given the freedom to do this. The legal system is 
therefore autonomous in the use of its schematism of legal and illegal, which is 
available only to it. But in using this schematism it must also secure the autopoiesis 
of society’s communication system as much as possible against as many disturbances 
produced by this system as possible. It must forestall society by producing its own 
insecurities and instabilities, and thus it is not allowed to go “astray”, it is not permitted 
to wander outside the problems that can be expected (Luhmann 1995: 375-376).
Here the functioning of the legal system is connected to the idea of “autopoiesis”; the legal system 
serves the autopoiesis of the social communication system. It is important to recall that in Luhmann 
the social system is defined by communication, the law therefore is upholding the social system by 
preserving communication. Luhmann offers a very clear description of immunitary mechanisms and 
their autopoietic function in his presentation of the second system relevant in human life, the psychic 
system:
In terms of their function, emotions can be compared to immune systems; they seem 
to assume an immunizing role for the psychic system […]. With unusual means, they 
secure the continuing performance of autopoiesis – here not the autopoiesis of life 
but of consciousness – in the face of problems that arise, and in doing so they use 
simplified procedures of discrimination, which permit decisions without considering 
the consequences. […]
Perhaps the most important insight, however, is that all emotions occur as essentially 
unitary and homogeneous […]. This results not only from increased interdependence 
with bodily occurrences, through which one experiences emotion, but also from 
the immunizing function, which, to guarantee autopoiesis against unforeseeable 
disturbances, cannot keep in store a separate emotion for everything that happens. 
One can establish in the biochemical domain that emotions occur as a unity, but 
emotions are more than interpreted biochemistry – they are the psychic system’s self-
interpretation with regard to whether its operation can continue. (Luhmann 1995: 274)
Luhmann’s description of the functioning of emotions calls to mind Sigmund Freud’s analysis of the 
mechanisms of dreaming. While in Freud it is the dreams that guarantee the continuation of sleep, 
in Luhmann homogeneous emotions function as guarantors for the continuation of the autopoiesis 
of consciousness. Indeed, in post-Freudian scientific analysis dreams do not only function as 
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374):
One can see the nexus of law and immune system more clearly if one considers that 
law is formed in anticipation of possible conflict. This focus on conflict extracts from 
the enormous number of everyday expectations that have been formed those that prove 
successful when conflict arises. This prospect of proving successful is associated with 
the normativity of expectations and brought under the schematism of legal and illegal, 
thus into a complete universe in which there are only two values, which mutually 
exclude each other. This schematism can generalize and anticipate experiences of 
conflict and thus bring them into a form in which conflicts on the level of interaction 
are merely exceptions, even when quite improbable expectations are formed. 
(Luhmann 1995: 374)
One parallel of legal system and (biological) immune system is “anticipation of possible conflict”. 
Luhmann, too, adopts the idea that an immune system is based on prior information (Sloterdijk’s 
“foreknowledge”). Its activities start from a hypothetical point. For the time being we shall consider 
the binary schematism, in law of “legal and illegal” (or “permitted and forbidden”), and in the 
immune system of “familiar and unfamiliar” or “benign and malignant”4, as a second parallel, even 
though we will later understand that this relationship is much more complicated. The third parallel 
concerns the method of procedure: neither the legal system nor the biological immune system is 
(primarily) interested in explanation, insight or prognosis. Luhmann compares the legal proscription 
of denial of justice (“Verbot der Justizverweigerung”) with the immune system’s inherent 
compulsion to decision making. 
The schematism of “legal and illegal” does not lead to a better understanding of expectations, 
actions and motivations. Quite the contrary, the information processing in law is designed to function 
when understanding fails and conflict arises. This also means, according to Luhmann, that “[l]aw 
does not serve to avoid conflicts”, it rather leads to “immensely greater opportunities of conflict” 
(Luhmann 1995: 375). The function of law is merely to avoid unrestrained and violent direct conflict 
and replace it by a special form of communication which suits the specific situation of the conflict. In 
Luhmann’s words: “Law serves to continue communication by other means” (Luhmann 1995: 375).
It is not the function of law to ensure that as much as possible is treated as legal and 
as little as possible is treated as illegal. That would be easy: one would only have to 
4 A dichotomy not introduced by Niklas Luhmann himself, though appropriate.
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(Luhmann 1995: 369).
Contradictions articulate self-reference, and thus they are specific forms of 
self-reference. Their function is to preserve the formal unity of meaningful 
interconnections, indeed, to make it stand out. They do not strengthen the security 
of the expectations normally bound up with these interconnections, but rather 
dissolve it. Contradictions destabilize a system, and they reveal this in the insecurity 
of expectation. […] One must guard against the widespread error of thinking that 
destabilization as such is dysfunctional. Instead, complex systems require a high 
degree of instability to enable on-going reaction to themselves and their environment, 
and they must continually reproduce this instability. (Luhmann 1995: 367)
Luhmann provides a very informative example based on contradiction from the realm of social 
immune systems: the calculation of costs.
One can find an important guiding image for this in the calculation of costs. The 
concept of costs designates a specific form of contradiction – something that one does 
not want but intentionally brings about nonetheless. In this, costs have a warning 
function that approaches an immune system. They are also like an immune system in 
that they cannot function ad hoc, but presuppose systematization. In other words, they 
depend on externalization to discriminate costs that should be considered internally.
The calculation of costs reveals – and “undoes” – negative aspects of actions because 
once the costs have been calculated, one acts only if the advantages appear to outweigh 
the disadvantages. The more costs that can be included, and the more the calculation 
can be extended – for example, to temporal and psychic costs, or even (as in Pascal’s 
famous calculation) to endangering the salvation of one’s soul – the more sensitive to 
contradiction the action becomes. Then one only needs maxims for decision, such as 
that the costs must at least be covered or that among comparable actions one should 
choose the most cost-effective – and already many actions that could be chosen are 
excluded from the domain of possibilities. They are presented as mere possibilities, 
produced as antibodies, so to speak, to ward off risks, to tie up whatever is negative. 
(Luhmann 1995: 381-382)
Indeed, in the example of the calculation of costs, contradictions (like “debit” and “credit”) articulate 
self-reference. Furthermore, the contradictory side makes the interconnection stand out. Yet at the 
same time they dissolve the security of any expectations. In his example Luhmann tries to give 
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guarantors of sleep, but also as promoters of autopoiesis of the body and mind in the sleeping 
subject. Luhmann’s argument shows, that the foremost function of any immune system is to uphold 
autopoiesis of the system it belongs to. Thus, emotions carry out this function in the psychic system, 
while laws do so in the social system.
Yet, although the connection of social or psychic immune systems and autopoiesis is quite 
plausible and may be regarded as basically sufficiently explained, the mechanisms of immune 
systems are still not fully accounted for. This leads us back to the example of law as an immune 
system: Again, it is plausible that the legal system secures the autopoiesis of society against as 
many disturbances as possible. It is also plausible in this argument that it therefore must produce 
its own insecurities and instabilities in order to anticipate possible conflict. However, this does not 
yet explain, why the legal system, in its capacity as immune system, does not seek to avoid conflict, 
but rather increases the opportunities for conflict within the social system. In order to explain this, 
Luhmann resorts to a more theoretical sociological discussion of “contradiction” as the basis of 
conflict and its functions in his theory of social systems.
According to Luhmann contradictions are as much a common topic in sociology, as they are 
unappreciated in philosophy. He refers to Hegel in his argument that “the social is excluded from 
the environment of science by a logic that must postulate objects as free of contradiction” (Luhmann 
1995: 358). In a sociological perspective and in autopoietic systems, however, contradictions play 
a different role: “Contradictions have an entirely different function depending on whether one is 
dealing with autopoietic operations or observations” (Luhmann 1995: 359-360). Luhmann argues that 
for an observer (be he within the system or outside) contradiction means undecidability. He cannot 
continue his observation if he has to deal with a distinction of mutually exclusive designations. In an 
autopoietic system, however, contradictions function quite differently; they present a specific form of 
connecting further operations.
This does not return to a “dialectical” function for contradictions because one 
can replace that function with an evolutionary theoretical perspective. Evolution 
presupposes self-reproduction and observation. It comes about by deviant 
self-reproduction. […] It is not a logical process. […] Evolution proceeds by 
undecidabilities. It uses the opportunities that undecidabilities sort out as opportunities 
for morphogenesis. (Luhmann 1995: 360)
Only instability allows self-reproduction and can prevent the system from ceasing to exist. Therefore 
instability is a precondition for evolution. On the other hand, it is not enough for the system to 
simply survive, it has to maintain its “essential variables”, including, of course, the interdependence 
of dissolving and reproducing activities and the capacity of self-observation and discrimination 
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The immune system is a network of organs, tissues and cells that defends the body 
against attacks by  “foreign” bodies such as bacteria, viruses, parasites and fungi that 
can cause disease. It has an amazing ability to track down these pathogens and target 
them for destruction.
The organs of the immune system include the tonsils, spleen and small bean-shaped 
lymph nodes laced through tiny lymphatic vessels. They all house lymphocytes, 
small white blood cells that are the immune system’s key players. Immune cells often 
have specialized functions – they can engulf and digest bacteria, for instance, or kill 
parasites. They include “killer T cells”, which mature in the thymus and attack tumors 
and virus-infected cells. Some T cells “remember” past foes and quickly mount a 
vicious assault on subsequent encounters.
Unfortunately, immune systems sometimes engage in friendly fire, causing disease 
by destroying healthy human tissues. Other problems arise from suppressed immune 
systems, which can make people vulnerable to diseases such as pneumonia. (Muir 
2001: 226; all italics by H.H.)
The words in italics show to what extent immune systems are envisioned as military operations, not 
only in the sense that they defend and attack, they are also metaphorically endowed with willpower 
(to achieve victory) and human fallibility (engage in friendly fire). Some of Napier’s charges are 
directed against these militaristic conceptualizations as well as against the accompanying “hero epic” 
(Napier 2003: 69) – a metamorphosis of scientific language into dramatic fiction. Military language 
has vastly been used to describe not only reactions and actions in microbiology, but also in Darwinist 
competition and “fitness” scenarios. Napier’s main criticism, however, goes much deeper and 
touches the very core of immunological thinking:
Here is a domain of scientific inquiry that by its own definition exists specifically 
in order better to elucidate the biological influence of “other” on “self”; and though 
immunology is now a very complex, subtle, and sophisticated science, it is essential to 
remember that it is, and always has been, a science of “foreign bodies”, one where “self” 
and “not-self” are specified on the molecular level in the paradigmatic battle between 
antigen (foreign invader – i.e. antibody generator ) and antibody (defender of self – 
i.e., anti-foreign body). (Napier 2003: 41) 
In fact, immunology has designed itself in over one hundred years as a scientific endeavor 
analyzing the conflict-laden, if not to say: warring, relationship of „self“ and „other“, or as 
immunologists prefer to call it „self“ and „not-self“ – even though they were only dealing with the 
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a congruent image of risk calculation and the functioning of the immune system. To support his 
argument, he inserts the word “undo” (the German original says “vernichten” – “destroy”) and the 
metaphorical use of “antibodies”. Although Luhmann usually insists on comparative functionality 
between biological and social immune systems and rejects the idea of mere metaphor, here, he 
himself resorts explicitly to metaphor (“so to speak”). 
The nexus to the immune system is quite evident. In order to summarize, Luhmann pinpoints 
all necessary characteristics that make up the immune system and clarifies their functions, stressing 
most of all the fact that an immune system has to be compatible to changing conditions and therefore 
does not at all costs defend the existence of the structure under attack:
Because contradictions enable but do not compel the elimination of deviations, they 
have qualities that promote the development of an immune system. An immune system 
must be compatible with self-reproduction under changing conditions. It is not simply 
a mechanism for correcting deviations and re-establishing the status quo ante; it must 
manage this function selectively, namely, must be able also to accept useful changes. 
It does not serve to preserve unconditionally the structures under attack, but also 
presupposes structures and limits of possibility for its own functioning and especially 
for recognizing contradictions. (Luhmann 1995: 369)
We see that both, Peter Sloterdijk and Niklas Luhmann, have a very complex notion of immune 
systems. In their view, they do not simply function to defend their master systems, and they are 
certainly not as “trigger-happy” as presented in most popular and pseudo-scientific accounts. 
Furthermore, throughout Sloterdijk’s and Luhmann’s presentations a reliable scientific description 
of the “nature”, of the bio-chemical functioning of immune agents or immune systems remains 
unaccounted for. Although Niklas Luhmann’s German version of Social Systems is as old as 1984, 
it, too, is already part of an era in which scientific immunology was being considered as somewhat 
obsolete, pushed aside by triumphant clonal selection and genetic control (Silverstein 20092: 441-
453). David A. Napier’s vehement criticism of scientific immunology will give us some insights 
into why Sloterdijk and Luhmann avoid a clear description of immunitary functions and the immune 
system as a whole.
IV. 
In order to understand why David A. Napier is lashing out so mercilessly at scientific 
immunologists, let us first look at a typical (pseudo-) scientific description of the immune system:
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himself resorts explicitly to metaphor (“so to speak”). 
The nexus to the immune system is quite evident. In order to summarize, Luhmann pinpoints 
all necessary characteristics that make up the immune system and clarifies their functions, stressing 
most of all the fact that an immune system has to be compatible to changing conditions and therefore 
does not at all costs defend the existence of the structure under attack:
Because contradictions enable but do not compel the elimination of deviations, they 
have qualities that promote the development of an immune system. An immune system 
must be compatible with self-reproduction under changing conditions. It is not simply 
a mechanism for correcting deviations and re-establishing the status quo ante; it must 
manage this function selectively, namely, must be able also to accept useful changes. 
It does not serve to preserve unconditionally the structures under attack, but also 
presupposes structures and limits of possibility for its own functioning and especially 
for recognizing contradictions. (Luhmann 1995: 369)
We see that both, Peter Sloterdijk and Niklas Luhmann, have a very complex notion of immune 
systems. In their view, they do not simply function to defend their master systems, and they are 
certainly not as “trigger-happy” as presented in most popular and pseudo-scientific accounts. 
Furthermore, throughout Sloterdijk’s and Luhmann’s presentations a reliable scientific description 
of the “nature”, of the bio-chemical functioning of immune agents or immune systems remains 
unaccounted for. Although Niklas Luhmann’s German version of Social Systems is as old as 1984, 
it, too, is already part of an era in which scientific immunology was being considered as somewhat 
obsolete, pushed aside by triumphant clonal selection and genetic control (Silverstein 20092: 441-
453). David A. Napier’s vehement criticism of scientific immunology will give us some insights 
into why Sloterdijk and Luhmann avoid a clear description of immunitary functions and the immune 
system as a whole.
IV. 
In order to understand why David A. Napier is lashing out so mercilessly at scientific 
immunologists, let us first look at a typical (pseudo-) scientific description of the immune system:
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2003: 73)
“Autotoxication”, “autoimmunity” because of their obvious relationship to “identity” are the 
key words to the crux of immunological phraseology and conceptualizations, together with 
transplantation and tumor immunology they mark the major issues immunology is facing today. Yet 
the scientists do not seem to find a way around the self/not-self model, except discarding the whole 
concept of “self” once and for all (Napier 2003: 203):
While immunologists are not metaphysicians, one can readily see that this debate 
hinges on an idea about selfhood that is almost wholly unexamined, or if examined, 
blissfully uninformed by the diverse ways that philosophers – not to mention other 
cultural traditions – have constructed what we call “identity”. […] This lacuna is 
made glaringly obvious by the degree to which immunology has traditionally hinged 
on a recognition and elimination of biological difference, by the unsolved problems 
that self/nonself models have created, by the discipline’s current attempts to jettison 
the self/nonself nomenclature, by the inability of immunologists to define “selfhood” 
in any novel way – in other words, by a wide array of problems all of which bear the 
scent of culturally tendentious parochial thinking. (Napier 2003: 203-204)
According to David Napier, an immunological construction of selfhood that focuses solely on 
recognition and elimination of difference cannot cure illnesses. What is desperately needed is a more 
assimilative model of self, one that Napier finds not only in other cultures. Conceptualizations of the 
maternal or the fetal are based on assimilative models of selfhood. Napier even mentions the human 
gut, digestion system, without which it is impossible for human selfhood to survive. And even the 
“humble parasitic worms that once populated the guts of most humans” may have had their share in 
controlling human autoimmunity by simply engaging the immune system. (Napier 2003: 286). The 
relationship of self and other is certainly manifold and calls for far more creative approaches than 
most immunologists were able to envisage.
V.
Yet it would be wrong to condemn immunologists wholesale. Especially at the beginning, in the 
nineteenth century, when the word “immunology” did not even exist, and when the new scientific 
field was still like a dark continent, many researchers relied on their vivid imaginations or on what 
they regarded as God’s design. And furthermore they were led in their research approaches by 
the already established neighboring disciplines: botany held its sway over the new research field, 
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tiniest elements in biology or chemistry, sometimes analyzing nothing more than the phenomena of 
dye acceptance (Paul Ehrlich). Yet the bulk of scientific analysis and theorization, and certainly its 
reputation and image, were linked to research on pandemic diseases – quickly to be implemented in 
public healthcare. Immunologists were therefore prone to design concepts of self and enemy. This 
atmosphere of hygienic crusades was likely to promote the imagery of hostile agents opposed to a 
“self” whose “integrity” and “identity” had to be safeguarded.
The main thrust of David Napier’s criticism of immunology is, of course, directed against the 
limitations or complete absence of philosophical, anthropological, or cultural-studies expertise in 
the formulations of immunological scenarios. It is those basic questions of these disciplines about 
“self”, “other”, and “identity” which are grossly and inexcusably neglected by a natural science 
that prides itself of clarifying the relationship of “self” and “not-self”. In his fierce criticism of such 
“immunological” blunders, David Napier is certainly not at a loss for examples, nor is he sparing 
with his sharp sarcasm against such scientists. He quotes the works of none lesser than the two 1960 
Nobel-Prize winners Peter B. Medawar and F. Macfarlane Burnet in order to show how the limited, 
outmoded Western concepts of “identity” and “self” stumble over scientific displays of seemingly 
“illogical selfs”:
Medawar’s ideas about acquired immunologic tolerance developed out of his 
demonstration that mice could “learn” to accept foreign tissue if injected with allogenic 
bone marrow at or before birth; Burnet’s contribution was predicated on the body’s 
production of antibodies that recognized foreignness (i.e. “not-self”) but, in so doing, 
did not recognize “self”. (Napier 2003: 202)
According to Napier, the insistency on a presupposed “integral self” mystifies scientific research 
where alternative, and explicitly non-Western, perspectives might have ready answers. In this critical 
perspective the “self” appears as the holy cow of (Western) immunology. “Self-consciousness” 
therefore is regarded as the paramount and indispensable disposition, “unselfconsciousness”, is 
depicted as a horrifying aberrance or a dangerous adversary, depending on perspective. 
Immunology, in its fear of the unselfconscious, is, therefore, no more or no less 
the victim of post-enlightenment metaphysics than is any other field of inquiry or 
domain of experience. What distinguishes immunology, though, is its hysteria – that 
is, the vehemence with which it curiously denies the very metaphorical mechanisms 
of embodiment while unconsciously reviving a demonology better suited to the 
Dark Ages. It is immunology’s hysterical fear of possession that causes Descartes’s 
enlightened reverse engineering to take its final toll autotoxically on the self. (Napier 
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each other with no sharp differences. An earlier distinction between the continuity 
of individuals and the absolute differences between species, genera, and orders 
has disappeared. All is flowing and changing, species and genera as much as the 
individuals, which are composed of smaller units, like the higher classes. Unendlich[e] 
Theilbarkeit is true of the whole of nature; and so is continuous change. (Mazumdar 
2002: 34)
In the philosophical foundation of his argument, he follows again Kant, who stipulated that each 
science is scientific only in proportion to the amount of mathematics involved. Neither human beings 
nor sciences can conceive of absolute different properties, all difference is understood as relative 
or quantitative, thereby mathematical. There is no absolute difference in nature. “Nägeli traces a 
continuity from chemical molecules to crystals, to the parts of the cell and the cell itself, through the 
plant and the animal kingdom to human consciousness” (Mazumdar 2002: 36).
Some twenty years later, Koch’s famous disciple Paul Ehrlich, however, when facing his 
problem of dye adaptation chooses wholeheartedly the path of solution that is staked out by diversity 
and specificity and not by unity and continuity. He sports the chemical explanation which demands 
not only specification of the elements entering the process, but even comes up with a new compound: 
a double salt. The effect must be chemical specific, Ehrlich declares, because it occurs only between 
the two salts involved (Mazumdar 2002: 110). In spite of the factionalism and sectarianism, the 
fierce fighting over conceptualizations and philosophies between major groups in the formative years 
of immunology (e.g. Koch vs. Pasteur and Gruber vs. Ehrlich), the idea of species and specificity, 
so closely interlinked with the concepts of “self” and “other”, “identity” and “individuality”, would 
become the prevailing doctrine.
VI. 
After the presentation of the fierce criticism of David A. Napier and the attempts at alternative 
conceptualization of Carl von Nägeli, it must have become quite obvious why Peter Sloterdijk and 
Niklas Luhmann are not too interested in focusing on scientific descriptions of the immunitary 
concepts and the immune system. The “repatriation” of such concepts as “self”, “nonself”, “other”, 
“identity”, and “individuality” to the discourses of the humanities and social sciences, and especially 
to post-colonial and post-structuralist theories, would be all too embarrassing. Instead, both thinkers 
take scientific immunology only as a starting point from which to design their own concepts: 
Sloterdijk the Homo immunologicus and his anthropotechnics, Luhmann a social immune system 
based on contradiction rather than discrimination and elimination of non-self. Both make use of the 
scientific research results in order to circumvent “subjectivity” and “intentionality”, replacing these 
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especially with its Linnaean nomenclature and specification systems with classification into species, 
genera, order, and individual:
For Schleiden’s generation, and for Nägeli in his earlier days, specificity had been a 
botanical problem. For Koch and the older Nägeli, it was a problem of bacteriology. 
For the next generation, it became a problem of immunology: bacterial species, in the 
absence of visible, morphological differentiae, might be defined by their reaction with 
specific antisera. (Mazumdar 2002: 8)
While the famous Berlin-based Robert Koch was in favor of species and specificity as modes 
of analysis, the Swiss Carl von Nägeli in Munich followed a theory of Kontinuität and quantitative 
Abstufung, continuity and quantitative gradual transition, partly gained from a rather arbitrary 
adaptation of Kant’s critical philosophy to the natural sciences and partly from Matthias Schleiden’s 
research which replaced the concept of well-defined species by one of gradual differences. In his 
Gattungen einzelliger Algen, an investigation oriented along the lines of natural history published in 
1848, Nägeli analyzed single cell algae in order to find the essence, the concept of the species. From 
then on Nägeli was no longer interested in differentiae, but tried instead to understand the transitions 
that were supposed to connect different forms of life.
In his work on the fine structure of living matter, for example, he examines the 
transition between living and nonliving; in his phylogeny he sees a continuous flow 
of forms passing into each other from an origin at this transition point. His theory of 
fermentation and his bacteriology are built upon specifische quantitative Abstufungen: 
species differ from each other only quantitatively, by gradual transitions. Everything 
is connected to everything else: each of these fields is linked in nature to the others. 
(Mazumdar 2002: 31)
In 1856 he added to this a “genetic theory of descent”, Vervollkommnungsprincip, or drive to 
perfection, which can be traced back to the conceptualizations of dynamic natural philosophy by late 
eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century German physiologists, and was compatible with Darwin’s 
theory of natural selection, adding to it an additional mechanism of increasing complexity. Indeed, 
Darwin may have been influenced by such conceptualizations (Mazumdar 2002: 33-36):
Species develop, increase in complexity, and flow continuously upward. The species 
itself is an individual composed of other individuals, as a tree is of cells. The species 
and the genus are as real as the individual, and like individuals, they shade in to 
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by their specific concepts of agency. Both also try to bridge the traditional gap between humanities 
and natural sciences, between body and mind.
Now that we have come to understand the protean appearance of concepts of immunity 
throughout history in the natural sciences, in the humanities and social sciences, an assessment 
of post-Fukushima Japanese society does no longer seem as easy a task as it may have been 
from the point of view of German public criticism. The variability of discrimination results and 
countermeasures of a social immune system in case of danger or disaster does not allow only one 
single reaction. Japanese are most likely much more used to seismographic activities, which are 
almost a part of their everyday life, than Germans. Yet, why the Japanese public is less fearful 
of nuclear disaster than the German remains to be analyzed. The near future only can show, 
whether Japanese reactions and countermeasures were appropriate or not, how much radioactive 
contamination the Japanese society and its human members can survive, or whether Japan’s 
social immune system will turn its back on an obsolete structure for the sake of autopoeisis and 
morphogenesis. The warning call that was sounded by the Luhmannian social immune system was 
obviously not as clearly heard in Japan as it was in Germany. So far the main reactions in Japan 
remain part of the limited immunitary task of repair work only. Building higher walls around nuclear 
plants to fend off tsunamis is still part of this kind of repair work, bound to remain again and again 
one step behind the next higher tsunami. The new national nuclear watchdog stands out alone as a 
countermeasure that theoretically could do away with the danger once and for all.
Two new pieces of insight, however, can be gained from applying Sloterdijk’s and Luhmann’s 
theories to post-Fukushima Japan: Some Japanese reactions to the nuclear disaster show clearly 
that Sloterdijk’s Homo immunologicus is as indigenous to Japanese society as he is to the Western 
ones. The solar panels mounted to the roofs of private houses show to what extent some Japanese 
have reacted to the alarming call of “You must change your life!”. Luhmann’s theory of a social 
immune system based on the corrective function of “contradiction” in order to enable survival and 
adaptability points relentlessly at a serious defect in today’s Japanese society, i.e. the lack of conflict 
as a pool for alternative strategies and as a stimulant for change.
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Barnardo: “Who’s there?”
Francisco: “Nay, answer me, stand and unfold yourself” (I.i.1-2)
The night sentinels are simply confused, but these two important first lines of Hamlet also 
contain an insistent promise giving covert assurance that the playwright will reveal his most central 
and private aspects. Hamlet, Shakespeare’s unique and “all-accommodating, ‘personal’ expression”, 
(Honan 1999: 280) proves that the author’s promise of self-revelation is generously kept, though 
disguised and Hermetically presented.
I. A Hermetic Shakespeare
It is notably in the scholarship of Hillary Gatti, and the late Dame Frances Yates, scholars of 
Giordano Bruno and the Renaissance who both addressed Shakespeare on the side, that we find 
sustained and convincing support for the presence of the Hermetic in Shakespeare. 
Mysteriously, Yates claimed in 1975 that, “Bruno’s Hermetic version of the art of memory 
seemed to raise the question whether here might be a clue to the vast powers of Shakespeare’s 
imagination….but the time for writing a book on ‘Shakespeare and the Hermetic Tradition’ had not 
come nor has it come.” (Yates 1978: 3) In The Art of Memory, Yates elusively refers to “the secret of 
Shakespeare…that has been missed” (Yates 1966: 353), and adds that the reason it had been missed 
was the exclusion of “ the two native Hermetic philosophers, John Dee and Robert Fludd….from the 
attention of those interested in the English Renaissance.” (Yates 1966: 353) 
What was this “secret” that Yates hints at? Befitting a true scholar of Hermeticism, she left no 
record, but perhaps she is also alluding to it in this passage in Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic 
Tradition in 1964:
An entirely new approach to the problem of Bruno and Shakespeare will have to be 
made. The problem goes very deep and must include the study in relation to Bruno, 
of Shakespeare’s profound preoccupation with significant language, language which 
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